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Margaret E. Webb*, Daniel R. Little and Simon J. Cropper
Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
The feeling of insight in problem solving is typically associated with the sudden
realization of a solution that appears obviously correct (Kounios et al., 2006). Salvi
et al. (2016) found that a solution accompanied with sudden insight is more likely to
be correct than a problem solved through conscious and incremental steps. However,
Metcalfe (1986) indicated that participants would often present an inelegant but plausible
(wrong) answer as correct with a high feeling of warmth (a subjective measure of
closeness to solution). This discrepancy may be due to the use of different tasks
or due to different methods in the measurement of insight (i.e., using a binary vs.
continuous scale). In three experiments, we investigated both findings, using many
different problem tasks (e.g., Compound Remote Associates, so-called classic insight
problems, and non-insight problems). Participants rated insight-related affect (feelings
of Aha-experience, confidence, surprise, impasse, and pleasure) on continuous scales.
As expected we found that, for problems designed to elicit insight, correct solutions
elicited higher proportions of reported insight in the solution compared to non-insight
solutions; further, correct solutions elicited stronger feelings of insight compared to
incorrect solutions.
Keywords: insight, problem solving, accuracy
INTRODUCTION
Insight or Aha is often identified as the subjectively distinct feeling of sudden and unexpected
understanding that may accompany attempts to solve a problem (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995;
Davidson and Sternberg, 2003; Cushen and Wiley, 2012; Weisberg, 2014). This feeling of sudden
comprehension often alerts the problem solver to a potentially correct solution (Irvine, 2015).
However, as noted as early as Poincaré (1913), feelings of Ahamay also accompany ideas that turn
out to be incorrect. Recent investigations into the relationship between Aha and accuracy indicate
that the Aha experience predicts accuracy (Salvi et al., 2012, 2016); however, these investigations
focus on non-classic insight problems (i.e., problems such as Compound Remote Associates,
Rebus Puzzles, and Anagrams, as opposed to the classic riddle-like problems favored by Gestalt
psychologists that typically populate the insight problem solving literature). In this paper, we
compare newer “non-classic” insight problems with the classic problems and non-insight problems
and explore the accuracy-Aha relationship across problem types.
Definitions of insight vary on three dimensions: process, task, and phenomenology (Öllinger and
Knoblich, 2009). Process concerns the cognitive mechanisms through which insightful solutions are
generated. Descriptions of an insightful problem solving process emphasize a sudden certainty of
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a correct response, with little or no conscious access to
the processing of the solution, whereas an analytic process
emphasizes a deliberate and systematic evaluation of the
problem, emphasizing logical deduction and strategic thinking
(Kounios et al., 2008; Topolinski and Reber, 2010).
The task dimension concerns the identification of tasks that
elicit sudden (insight) solutions; these tasks are often identified
through comparison to other tasks that require stepwise solutions
(Öllinger and Knoblich, 2009). The concept of a problem space iin
which all possible problem states are mapped provides a useful
tool for differentiating problem types. A regular problem has
a well-defined problem space with operators that are obvious
enough to enable steady stepwise progress toward the solution
(DeYoung et al., 2008). In contrast, an ill-defined problem does
not allow a clear mapping of the initial problem space, and
the method of achieving the solution is unclear. Indeed, an ill-
defined problem often deliberately extends the problem space by
misdirecting the solver (Ovington, 2016). For these problems,
insight is often described as a restructuring of ill-defined problem
space, which occurs after a period of impasse. The sudden
narrowing of the problem space enables an easier generation of
a solution. Classic insight tasks are typical of ill-defined problems
(DeYoung et al., 2008).
The phenomenology of insight focuses on the Aha experience
and is typically examined using case studies and anecdotes;
however, there has been a recent push to explore the
phenomenology using self report in laboratory studies (e.g.,
Bowden et al., 2005; Danek et al., 2014b). The use of the term
insight is inclusive of the Aha experience as well as other insight
related affect, such as confidence, impasse, surprise and pleasure,
proposed to accompany an Aha experience (Danek et al., 2014a).
Insight Problems and Problems Thereof
The methodological challenges of objectively measuring a
subjective phenomenon such as insight are well known
(Öllinger and Knoblich, 2009; Ash et al., 2009). Historically,
researchers have used “classic insight problems,” ill-defined
problems originally used by Gestalt psychologists to elicit
feelings of insight upon realization of the solution. Gestalt
psychologists investigated insight as the result of perceptual
and cognitive restructuring (Klein and Jarosz, 2011). This is
of note predominately because the Gestaltists had backgrounds
in visual science and were particularly invested in perceptual
restructuring, which is a sudden change in which an object is
perceived (say in Rubin’s Face/Vase illusion, where the perception
shifts from figure/face to ground/vase). Similarly, much insight
research revolves around cognitive restructuring, a sudden change
in the way a problem is perceived. Restructuring the problem
makes the correct solution easy to obtain. This sudden ease of
solution results in the feelings of pleasure, joy, and the rise of
confidence associated with insight.
An example of a classic insight problem follows:
Water lilies double in area every 24 h. At the beginning of summer
there is one water lily on the lake. It takes 60 days for the lake to
become completely covered with water lilies. On which day is the
lake half covered? (Sternberg and Davidson, 1982).
The answer (59) may or may not be immediately apparent:
problem solvers frequently fixate on what they perceive as the
key information of “60 days,” and “half full” and either begin
calculating the answer from day 1 or conclude that the answer is
30 (Bowden, 1997). For others, it becomes immediately apparent
that, if water lilies double in area every 24 h and that if the
lake is full on day 60, it must be half full on day 59 (see
Appendix for other example problems). This question functions
as an insight problem only if the solver initially misconstrues
the problem space (focusing on the information of “60” and
“half-full”). Sudden realization of the solution is accompanied
by a feeling of certainty, as the answer is simple to check. For a
comprehensive review of this style of research, see Sternberg and
Davidson (1995).
Non-insight problems have been used as a control for insight
problems, particularly when contrasting individual differences in
problem solving (e.g., Fleck, 2008; Gilhooly and Fioratou, 2009;
DeCaro et al., 2015). Non-insight problems are designed to be
solvable through a process of systematic application of knowledge
and logical deduction (Bowden, 1997, p. 548). For example:
If you have four coins, two slightly heavy and two slightly light,
but which look and feel identical, how could you find out which
are which in two weighings on a balance scale? (Schooler et al.,
1993).
The answer to this question requires systematic consideration
of the problem space, and potential steps toward solving the
problem. The solution: (1) place one coin either side (if they do
not balance, you have identified one heavy and one light coin),
(2) replace one coin with one of the remaining. This weighing
will provide the remaining information.
This problem and problems like it tend to be categorized as
a non-insight problems (Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005). However,
for someone with little or no training in logic, the underlying
mechanisms may involve the experience of insight. The Aha
experience may arise from recognizing that one cannot complete
this task in two weighings if one attempts to weigh all four
coins at once. From a from a phenomenological perspective, for
experienced puzzle solvers, it is possible that neither or possibly
both the heavy/light coin problem and the problem of the lilies
raised above may be considered insight problems (Bowden,
1997). In other words, classic insight and non-insight problems
alike can be solved with both insight and analysis (Weisberg,
2014). In the absence of feedback from the problem solver
or other kinds of compelling evidence, the previously held a
priori assumption that particular problems elicit insight, and are
solved using particular processes (i.e., insightful or analytic), is
highly problematic. Though classification and use of non-insight
problems stems largely from the seminal papers of Metcalfe and
Wiebe (1987) and Weisberg (1995), these authors noted the
vagueness of the distinction between insight and non-insight
problems, and there has been little systematic investigation of
insight and non-insight problem types since the publication of
those papers.
While research historically has contrasted classic insight
problems with non-insight problems, more contemporary
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research uses a single problem task as indicative of both
insightful and non-insightful problem solving, relying on the
participant’s self-report to determine whether or not insight has
occurred (e.g., Bowden, 1997; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a;
MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008). Non-classic problems (such
as Compound Remote Associates; Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003b), rebus puzzles (MacGregor and Cunningham, 2008),
or anagrams (Novick and Sherman, 2003; Salvi et al., 2016),
are presented to participants, who provide a solution and also
information about their experience of insight. This shift to asking
whether or not insight was experienced in these non-classical
problems was sparked by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003a) and
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004), and has been followed by a line of
research largely centered around Compound Remote Associates
(CRAs; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b).
The taxonomy of these problem tasks as pure insight, non-
insight or as both insight and non-insight (hybrid) has been
debated for decades (see particularly Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987;
Weisberg, 1995 for contrasting viewpoints). Yet there is little
recent evidence regarding the efficacy of classic (or proposed
pure) problems to elicit insight or, lack thereof, consistently.
There is also little investigation regarding the effect of accuracy
on insight.
Accuracy and Aha
Salvi et al. (2016) investigated four types of non-classic insight
problems (as classified by Cunningham et al., 2009): CRAs,
Rebus Puzzles, Anagrams, and Visual Puzzles and found that
insightful processes elicited a higher proportion of correct
responses. The authors had solvers use a dichotomous indication
of whether or not the problem had been solved insightfully or
analytically. Danek et al. (2016) used a similar dichotomous
measure, investigating three widely used classic insight problems,
and found that, across all problem types, participants reported
experiencing insight in only 51.9% of correctly solved trials.
Two questions arise from these studies: (1) are there differences
between classic and non-classic problem types in the degree
of insight elicited in the solution of each task, (2) are there
differences between so-called insight and non-insight problems,
and (3) what influence does solution accuracy have on the
experience of insight?
Methods of insight self-report have varied between:
dichotomous (insight/analytic) responses (Danek et al., 2016;
Salvi et al., 2016), Likert scales (Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003a), and rating scales (0–100; Danek et al., 2014a), but
have typically been analyzed as reports of insight (or insightful
processing) vs. non-insight (or analytical processing). The
strength of an insight response and its relationship with other
significant components of insight phenomenology (such as a
feeling of Impasse, and Confidence) are yet to be examined in
depth (Danek et al., 2014a, 2016).
Given the differences in the purported solution methods, ill-
defined problems such as classic insight problems and CRAs
may elicit greater amounts of insight compared to well-defined
problems such as non-insight problems. Nonetheless, non-
insight problems may also evoke insight in their solution,
though this may only be evident when insight is measured on a
continuous scale. Given the clarity of the problem space in non-
insight problems, performance accuracy may be higher when
problem solving is time-constrained in non-insight problems
compared to insight problems or CRAs.
The Present Research
The current study investigated ratings of insight (the Aha
experience and other insight-related affect: i.e., confidence,
surprise, impasse, and pleasure; Danek et al., 2014a) and
performance accuracy in order to examine the relationship
between accuracy and Aha across problem types (insight
problems, non-insight problems, and CRAs). We were interested
in the differences in performance accuracy andAha ratings across
problem types, and predicted that there would be (1) higher
accuracy rates on non-insight problems compared to insight
problems and CRAs, and (2) there would be significantly higher
ratings of Aha in insight problems and CRAs compared to non-
insight problems. We predicted that feelings of Aha would be
predictive of correct solutions in classic insight problems and
CRAs but that ratings of Aha would not be predictive of correct
solutions in non-insight problems.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
University of Melbourne students (193: 118 female, age range,
17–52, mean, 19.639) completed the study for course credit.
Before beginning the study, participants were provided with
consent forms detailing the proposed study. Nine participants
were removed for errors on more than 20% of the tasks.
Materials
Problem solving tasks
Insight in problem solving was measured with a mixture of
“classic” insight and non-insight problems, and compound
remote associates (CRAs; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b).
“Classic” insight and non-insight problems
Riddle tasks and brain teasers were drawn from the existing
insight problem solving literature (e.g., Schooler et al., 1993;
Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005; Karimi et al., 2007), and categorised
as insight and non-insight problems based on their classification
in previous studies (see Appendix 1 for problems). Participants
were given 4 min per problem to generate solutions. Accuracy
and RT were recorded.
Compound remote associates
CRAs (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b) are verbal association
tasks patterned after the Remote Associates Test (RAT: Mednick,
1962). Three words are presented to the participant, each of
which can be combined with a fourth word to make compound
words (e.g., potato/tooth/heart can all be combined with sweet).
CRAs were developed in response to criticisms of classic insight
problems, particularly the limited number of problems and the
need for different types of problems (incrementally solvable,
“non-insight problems”) used as a control. Participants had 30 s
to generate the fourth word.
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Procedure
Each participant was individually tested: problems sets and
questionnaires were presented in random order. No solutions
were given.
Problem solving sets
There were two problem-solving sets: classic and non-
classic problem solving, respectively. The classic “insight”
and “incremental” (non-insight) problems were randomly
interleaved within a set. Participants were given no information
about whether the problem to be solved was classified as
“insight” or “non-insight” but were given 4 min to work through
the problem. In the CRA problem set, 20 problems, selected for
varying difficulty levels (Bowden et al., 2005) were presented in
random order. Five practice trials preceded the set. Participants
were given 30 s to solve the word association task.
Before the problem solving set, participants were given the
following information (drawn from Danek et al. (2014b):
We would also like to know whether you experienced a feeling
of insight when you solve each task: A feeling of insight is a
kind of “Aha!” characterized by suddenness and obviousness (and
often relief!)—like a revelation. You are relatively confident that
your solution is correct without having to check it. In contrast,
you experienced no Aha! if the solution occurs to you slowly and
stepwise. As an example, imagine a light bulb that is switched on
all at once in contrast to slowly dimming it up. We ask for your
subjective rating whether it felt like an Aha! experience or not, there
is no right or wrong answer. Just follow your intuition.
After each problem solving task, participants rated five feelings
during the problem solving task: (1) Confidence that the given
response was correct (“very unsure” to “very sure”), (2) Strength
of the insight experience (“very weak” to “very strong”), (3)
Pleasantness of the insight experience (“very unpleasant” to “very
pleasant”), (4) Surprising nature of the insight experience (“not
surprising” at all to “very surprising”), (5) Feeling of impasse
before the insight experience (“no impasse” at all to “very
stuck”)1. Participants responded by moving a slider (pre-set at
50) along a scale of 0–100.
Questionnaires
A series of individual differences measures were presented in
random order. These included the O-LIFE (Oxford-Liverpool
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; Mason and Claridge,
2006), Raven’s (1985) Advanced Progressive Matrices, a verbal
fluency measure adapted from Lezak (2004), and an adaptation
of the Alternative Uses Task (AUT: Guildford et al., 1978). These
measures are reported elsewhere in a follow-up study of the same
sample.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Problems were scored as either correct or incorrect and averaged
across category (insight, non-insight, CRAs), as were the ratings
of insight related affect. Descriptive statistics of performance
1Scales 2:5 are drawn from the methodology of Danek et al. (2014b).
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations for accuracy and insight quale
for classic insight and non-insight problems, and for compound remote
associates (CRAs).
Experiment 1 Experiment 1a Experiment 2
M SD M SD M SD
CLASSIC INSIGHT PROBLEMS
Accuracy 0.51 0.28 0.49 0.25 0.45 0.30
Aha 45.16 21.05 49.25 25.25 42.47 18.11
Confidence 56.61 23.10 55.01 23.44 52.30 22.57
Impasse 54.04 21.02 57.63 15.99 55.27 17.40
Surprise 34.63 19.37 41.52 14.68 41.50 13.45
Pleasure 50.69 23.20 53.64 18.78 51.54 14.95
NON-INSIGHT PROBLEMS
Accuracy 0.54 0.25 0.64 0.19 0.56 0.27
Aha 35.00 16.40 64.40 19.25 36.34 18.11
Confidence 59.56 21.58 57.47 19.37 48.15 18.36
Impasse 50.49 18.96 48.52 16.04 49.85 18.55
Surprise 30.35 16.22 36.18 18.69 37.25 15.64
Pleasure 49.63 17.63 50.70 15.57 51.07 14.49
CRAs
Accuracy 0.37 0.20 0.45 0.20 0.47 0.16
Aha 30.66 13.81 41.50 20.34 38.45 13.11
Confidence 40.93 15.79 45.33 17.76 44.74 14.07
Impasse 59.92 14.19 63.01 15.87 55.35 15.04
Surprise 28.31 14.77 42.56 18.21 38.66 11.86
Pleasure 36.17 18.23 49.64 13.50 48.31 11.84
accuracy, and ratings of insight-related affect are displayed in
Table 1.
We include in our results the Bayes Factor (BF10), which
compares the ratio of model evidence for the alternative
hypothesis (i.e., that there is an effect) to the null hypothesis2.
This enables us to provide a more nuanced picture of the data
in relation to the question addressed by the experiment than a
standard p-value (Wagenmakers et al., 2016).
Accuracy and Insight: Differences across Problem
Types?
The first question was whether the accuracy of insight and non-
insight problem solving differed across problem types (classic-
insight, classic-non-insight and non-classic insight). A Bayesian
repeated-measures ANOVA indicated strong evidence for a
difference in accuracy of response between problem types,
BF10 >150, η2 = 0.22. The effect was largely explained by low
accuracy on CRAs compared to insight (mean difference = 0.14,
2Bayesian tests were computed using JASP (Love et al., 2015). The null hypothesis
indicates that the effect size equals zero; the alternative hypothesis is that the effect
size is not equal to 0 and is assigned a Cauchy prior (Rouder et al., 2009). Any
Bayes factor less than 1 (reported BF< 1) indicates support for the null hypothesis
(Kass and Raftery, 1995). Any BF > 150 indicates very strong support for the
alternative hypothesis. 1 < BF < 3 provides weak evidence for the alternative
hypothesis (“barely worth a mention,” Kass and Raftery, 1995, see also Jeffreys,
1961), 3 > BF > 20 is considered positive evidence for the alternative hypothesis,
and 20< BF< 150 is considered strong support for the alternative hypothesis.
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BF10 > 150) and non-insight (mean difference = 0.17,
BF10 > 150) problems (see Figure 1A). There was no
difference between insight and non-insight problems (mean
difference = 0.035, SE = 0.032, p = 0.81). The low accuracy
on CRAs is congruent with Bowden and Jung-Beeman’s (2003b)
normative data, from which the problems were drawn.
A second Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA (see
Figure 1B) indicated strong evidence for difference between
problem types on the level of reported insight, BF10 > 150.
Post-hoc analyses indicated that the effect was driven by
higher reported insight in insight problems compared to both
non-insight problems (mean difference = 10.15, BF10 > 150)
and CRAs (mean difference = 14.49, BF10 > 150). There
was no significant difference between CRAs and non-insight
problems (mean difference = 4.34, BF = 1.562). The difference
between insight and non-insight problems is congruent with
the literature indicating that these are solved with different
underlying processes (Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005; Chu and
MacGregor, 2011). The difference in ratings of insight between
insight problems and CRAs speaks against the use of CRAs as
insight problems; however, this may simply indicate that CRAs
are a hybrid insight problem (i.e., CRAs may be used as both
insight and non-insight problems, depending on self-reported
classification, e.g., Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003a; Salvi et al.,
2012). It may also reflect the reduced solution accuracy.
ACCURACY AND INSIGHT AFFECT:
RELATIONSHIPS
Pearson correlations suggest that accuracy is related to degree
of reported Aha for insight problems and CRAs but not for
non-insight problems (see Figure 2). There were moderately
strong, significant and positive relationships between feelings of
Aha and accuracy on both classic insight problems (r = 0.50,
BF10 > 150) and CRAs (r = 0.41, BF10 > 150); however,
there was no relationship between accuracy and non-insight
problems (r = 0.02, BF10 < 1). This relationship supports the
current assumptions within insight problem-solving literature
that insight problems result in feelings of insight in their accurate
solution but that non-insight problems do not (Gilhooly and
Murphy, 2005; Chu and MacGregor, 2011). The relationship
between accuracy and Aha on CRAs suggests that the difference
between insight problems and CRAs was indicative of a lack of
accuracy, rather than the use of CRAs as hybrid problems.
Across problem types, Aha was significantly and positively
related to Confidence, Pleasure, and Surprise (see Figure 2, see
Supplementary Materials for correlation matrices). Confidence
was the most strongly related with Aha ratings across problem
types, having a moderate to strong positive relationship with
Aha in insight and non-insight problems, and in CRAs.
The relationship between Aha and Impasse was negative and
significant for insight problems, and negative but non-significant
for both non-insight problems and CRAs. Interestingly, ratings
of Surprise were significantly and positively related with ratings
of Aha, but not with solution accuracy. This suggests the
importance of surprise in an Aha experience.
Summary
The results of Experiment 1 support the assumptions in the
literature: Aha occurred more often in insight than non-insight
problems. The moderate positive relationship between Aha and
performance accuracy on both classic insight problems and
CRAs indicated that performance accuracy was an important
component of insight affect in problem solving. This may be
indicative of the sudden ease of solution once the problem space
has been restructured and the solution is easy to realize.
The positive relationship between Surprise and Aha indicated
that Surprise may be an important component of the Aha
experience, more than the previously considered Impasse.
Low levels of accuracy potentially indicate that students with
English as a second language (ESL) may have experienced more
difficulty on some of the problems, as these problems require high
levels of English proficiency (Ansburg, 2000).
EXPERIMENT 1A
We sought in Experiment 1a to replicate our Experiment 1 results
using a sample that was explicitly selected with English as a first
language.
FIGURE 1 | Mean (A) accuracy and (B) reported insight across problem types, with separate lines representing the different experiments (Experiments
1a and 2 have participants are filtered for ESL students). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 2 | (A–C) Correlation plots between accuracy and insight and insight related affect. Size of the circle and saturation of color determine the strength of the
correlation; the color determined the direction of the relationship, with positive being blue (A: classic insight problems; B: classic non-insight problems; C: compound
remote associates. Only relationships with less than p = 0.05 have been graphed).
Methods
Participants
Undergraduates from the University of Melbourne (82: 64
female, age range, 16–47, mean, 19.60) completed the study for
course credit. Eight participants were removed for errors onmore
than 20% of the tasks.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1,
save that participants were tested online, and ESL students were
requested not to participate in the study.
Results and Discussion
The results of Experiment 1a replicated the very strong
support of differences between problem type on accuracy
found in Experiment 1, F(2, 158) = 33.98, BF10 > 150,
η2 = 0.30, with post-hoc analyses indicating significant
differences between all variables: Non-insight problems
demonstrated significantly higher accuracy than both
insight problems (mean difference = 0.15, BF10 > 150)
and CRAs (mean difference = 0.23, BF10 > 150), and insight
problems demonstrated higher accuracy than CRAs (mean
difference = 0.08, BF10 = 2.387). This marks a change from
Experiment 1, in which the low accuracy on CRAs alone drove
the observed difference. This change in results may be arising
from the filtering of ESL students.
The ANOVA conducted on the elicited Aha across problem
type demonstrated strong support for differences between
problem type, F(2, 158) = 33.98, BF10 = 29.90, η
2
= 0.084,
with insight problems eliciting significantly higher ratings of
insight than non-insight problems (mean difference = 6.130,
BF10 = 75.662). As in Experiment 1, CRAs and non-insight
problems demonstrated an anecdotal difference in reported
insight (mean difference = 2.105, BF10 = 1.592); however,
in another marked difference from Experiment 1, there was
no difference between insight problems and CRAs (mean
difference= 5.025, BF10 = 0.279). This fluctuation in results may
be indicative of the “hybrid” nature of CRAs (i.e., as both an
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insight and non-insight problem), an indication of the filter of
ESL students, or an indication of greater accuracy eliciting greater
insight.
Investigating the Relationship between Accuracy and
Aha
The moderate positive relationship between accuracy and insight
affect were replicated in insight problems (r = 0.40, BF10 > 150)
and CRAs (r = 0.40, BF10 = 85.65), see Figure 3; however, in
non-insight problems, the relationship between accuracy and
insight shifted from no relationship to a positive relationship,
albeit a weak one (r = 0.24, p = 0.04, BF10 = 48.502). This
marks a change from the current literature, in which non-insight
problems are used as controls. However, it is congruent with
statements fromWeisberg (2014) indicating that both insight and
non-insight problems can be solved through insightful or analytic
processes.
Investigating Relationships within Insight Affect
The direction of the relationships between accuracy and
insight related affect were replicated, as were the direction
of the relationships within insight related affect (i.e., Aha,
Confidence, Impasse, Pleasure, and Surprise). The relationship
of Surprise with performance accuracy and Aha ratings were
again interesting in this dataset: There was a negative relationship
between Surprise and performance accuracy, yet a positive weak-
to-moderate with Aha. Surprise may be the component of insight
related affect that is able to differentiate an Aha experience from
the pleasure and confidence of a solution.
Summary
Investigation of differences in Experiment 1a replicate the
findings in Experiment 1; that is, there is a significant difference
in performance accuracy and reported insight across problem
types. However, the relationship between accuracy and Aha
ratings reflects the growing indication that problems can be
solved with and without feelings of insight.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this study, we investigated the consistency of the relationship
between reported insight and problem type by replicating
FIGURE 3 | (A–C) Correlation plots between accuracy and insight and insight related affect. Size of the circle and saturation of color determine the strength of the
correlation; the color determined the direction of the relationship, with positive being blue (A: classic insight problems; B: classic non-insight problems; C: compound
remote associates. Only relationships with less than p = 0.05 have been graphed).
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the results from Experiments 1 and 1a. We also investigated
the effect of feedback on reported insight; this data is not
presented here as we focus instead on performance accuracy
on reported insight. We replicated the analyses of Experiment
1a, and extended these analyses by combining the datasets
of Experiments 1, 1a, and 2 to run a Multilevel Logistic
Regression.
Methods
Participants
Undergraduates from the University of Melbourne (129: 88
female; age range, 17–45, mean, 19.059) completed the tasks for
course credit. Twelve participants were removed for errors in
more than 20% of the tasks.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
The methods were the same as in Experiment 1a, but feedback
was given regarding the correctness of the solution (this data is
investigated in forthcoming papers). The affect-related questions
were asked both before and after the solution feedback was
given. In the current analysis, only the data from before accuracy
feedback was used.
Results and Discussion
Differences in Accuracy and Aha
As in the first two experiments, strong support for the effect
of problem type on solution accuracy, F(2, 224) = 7.964,
BF10 = 47.61, η2 = 0.066, with significantly higher accuracy on
non-insight problems compared to classic insight problems
(mean difference = 11.02, BF10 = 36.184) and CRAs
(mean difference = 8.94, BF10 = 15.040). There was no
significant difference between insight problems and CRAs (mean
difference = 0.02, BF10 = 0.133). This marks another change
from both previous experiments: The accuracy across problem
type is not consistent, but seems to follow a similar trend, with
higher accuracy on non-insight problems, lower accuracy on
insight problems.
As in the first two experiments, there was a significant
difference in the reported insight in response to the problems
F(2, 205) = 5.370, BF10 = 4.389. As in Experiment 1a, this
main effect was explained by the higher feelings of insight in
response to classic insight questions, compared classic non-
insight questions (mean difference = 6.13, BF10 = 4.679, see
Figure 1B). Similarly replicating Experiment 1a, there was no
significant difference either between reported insight between
CRAs and insight problems (mean difference = 4.025, BF10
= 1.572). There was also no significant difference between
non-insight problems and CRAs (mean difference = 2.105,
BF10 = 0.199). This may again reflect the use of CRAs as
hybrid problems. However, this inconsistency in differences
in reported insight across problem types, even keeping
the problems constant, flags potential problems in the use
of non-insight problems as controls in insight problem
studies, particularly without self-reported measures of
insight.
CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES
As in Experiment 1a, feelings of Aha were significantly, and
positively, correlated with accuracy across all problem types
(insight problems: r = 0.495, BF10 > 150; CRAs: r = 0.39,
BF10 > 150; non-insight problems: r = 0.19, BF10 = 40.007
(see Figure 4 for graphical representation, or Supplementary
Materials for correlation matrices). This replication of the
relationship between accuracy and Aha across all problem types
emphasizes the requirement of self-report before use of non-
insight problems as controls for insight problems.
The direction and strength of the relationships held for
Experiment 2 within insight related affect. This consistency of a
significant positive relationship with Surprise andAha, compared
to either a significant negative or non-significant relationship
between Surprise and solution accuracy again indicates the
importance of Surprise in the Aha experience.
MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS
We sought to determine how well accuracy could be predicted
from the subjective feeling of insight along with the other
measures recorded in our study: Impasse, Pleasure, Surprise,
and Problem Type. Due to high collinearity between ratings of
Confidence and Aha, we removed Confidence from the analysis.
We used a multilevel logistic regression in order to account
for different overall levels of accuracy for each subject (i.e., by
including different subject level intercepts) and different levels of
accuracy across problem types. We modeled the binary-valued
accuracy as a logistic function of these variables. Data from
native-English speaking participants from across Experiments 1,
1a, and 2, were combined for this analysis. (One question, the
Trace non-insight problem was removed from Experiments 1a
and 2 and is not analyzed here).
We compared a number of different multilevel models: The
first model included the rated feelings of: Insight, Impasse,
Pleasure and Surprise, as well as problem type and is given by
the equation:
yij = β0 + β1Insightij + β2Impasseij + β3Pleasureij+
β4Surpriseij + β5Typeij +
(
Si + εij
)
(1)
where yij is the binary response accuracy indicating whether
participant imake a correct (1) or incorrect (0) responses on item
j. Each term in the model represents participant i’s ratings on that
trait for item j. Each model also includes a set of subject-specific
random effects, Si, and an error term, εij.
We additionally fit a second model, which allowed for an
interaction between insight and problem type. This model is
based on the grounds that classic insight problems and CRAs
are proposed to elicit greater amounts of Aha than non-insight
problems:
yij = β0 + β1Insightij + β2Impasseij + β3Pleasureij+ (2)
β4Surpriseij + β5Typeij + β6Insightij × Typeij +
(
Si + εij
)
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FIGURE 4 | (A–C) Correlation plots between accuracy and insight and insight related affect (only data from before performance feedback was graphed). Size of the
circle and saturation of color determine the strength of the correlation; the color determined the direction of the relationship, with positive being blue (A: Classic insight
problems; B: classic non-insight problems; C: compound remote associates. Only relationships with less than p = 0.05 have been graphed).
For both models, we compared accuracy across insight,
CRAs, and non-insight problems through the inclusion of
a categorical Type variable. This allowed us to use non-
insight questions as a baseline and extract separate weights
for insight problems and CRAs. Additionally, for both
models, we systematically tested alternative random effects
by allowing intercept to vary by participant (Models 1 and
3), by allowing intercept and problem type to vary by subject
(Model 2), and by allowing intercept and the insight by
problem type interaction to vary by subject (Model 4). These
comparisons allow for (a) different overall performance
between participants, (b) different performance on each
type of problem, and (c) different levels of insight on
each problem type to be expressed between participants.
We determined the preferred model using the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC). The results are presented in
Table 2.
Comparison of the BICs pointed to Model 4 which included
the interaction between Insight and Problem Type both as
a fixed and random effect as the preferred model. As in all
models, as might be expected, insight had a positive effect on
accuracy, but the experience of impasse decreased accuracy.
Further contrasting effects were found for pleasure, which
increased accuracy, and surprise, which decreased accuracy.
Accuracy was poorer on insight problems than on CRAs or non-
insight problems, respectively. We also found higher interactions
between insight and CRAs than between insight and insight
problems.
OVERALL SUMMARY
The three studies demonstrate a difference in problem solving
and ability to elicit insight in insight and non-insight problems;
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TABLE 2 | Estimated parameters (and standard errors) of multilevel
modeling.
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
FIXED EFFECTS
Intercept (β0) 0.06 (0.11) 0.06 (0.12) 0.02 (0.10) 0.10 (0.12)
Insight (β1) 1.11 (0.06) 1.18 (0.06) 0.39 (0.10) 0.51 (0.14)
Impasse (β2) −1.07 (0.05) −1.16 (0.05) −1.01 (0.05) −1.08 (0.05)
Pleasure (β3) 1.05 (0.06) 1.11 (0.07) 1.02 (0.06) 1.11 (0.07)
Surprise (β4) −0.14 (0.05) −0.14 (0.05) −0.15 (0.05) −0.19 (0.05)
Type (Insight) (β5) −0.78 (0.12) −0.86 (0.14) −0.66 (0.11) −0.76 (0.13)
Type (CRAs) (β5) −0.48 (0.10) −0.50 (0.13) −0.45 (0.09) −0.44 (0.11)
Insight × Type
(Insight) (β6)
0.48 (0.13) 0.51 (0.17)
Insight × Type
(CRAs) (β6)
1.03 (0.11) 1.08 (0.17)
RANDOM EFFECTS VARIANCE
Intercept (S0) 1.14 1.62 1.12 1.23
Type (Insight) (s1) 1.00
Type (CRAs) (s1) 1.76
Insight × Type
(No Insight) (s2)
1.03
Insight × Type
(Insight) (s2)
0.88
Insight × Type
(CRAs) (s2)
0.78
EVALUATION
df 8 13 10 19
BIC 5839.0 5780.8 5771.3 5627.8
All significant coefficients are shown in bold font. df, degrees of freedom; BIC, Bayesian
Information Criterion.
however, the patterns elicited through correlation analyses
indicate a relationship between performance accuracy and
insight across problem types, when selected for English
proficiency. Particularly, the consistent occurrence of a
significant positive relationship between reported Aha and
non-insight problems is worthy of further investigation.
The results of the multilevel regression indicate the
importance of the problem type and components of insight
(surprise, impasse, Aha) elicited in the accuracy of a
problem solution. However, these results do not enable us
to differentiate between a feeling of insight as co-occurring
with a correct solution, and the process of arising at a
solution through insight-problem-solving vs. analytic problem
solving.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this work, we investigated the relationship between insight
and accuracy across three different problem types, comparing
classic “insight,” “non-insight” and non-classic insight problems
(CRAs). Insight related affect were predictive of correct solutions.
We also reflected upon the comparison of insight and “non-
insight” problems in the literature, finding that differences in
reported insight between problem types make the distinctions
in the literature seem valid; however, our secondary analysis
revealed a consistent relationship between accuracy and insight
ratings in non-insight problems, which emphasizes the issues
in the comparison of insight and non-insight problems without
self-report measures.
ACCURACY AND INSIGHT
Salvi et al. (2012, 2016) that a solution accompanied by insight
is more likely to be correct than a solution that is systematically
and consciously deduced. That is, insightful problem solving is
an all or none process, in which the problem solver arrives at
solution through processing which is subthreshold to awareness,
and therefore unconscious. The implication is that a solution
that has been obtained through an insightful process is not
consciously accessible until the process of problem solving has
been completed and therefore solutions are more likely to be
either correct or omitted. Salvi et al.’s (2016) data contrasts with
Metcalfe’s statement that feeling suddenly close to the solution
often marks an incorrect solution (Metcalfe, 1986, p. 633).
However, investigations of insight across experiments indicate
that there was a greater proportion of problems correctly solved
with insight than incorrectly solved with insight. The discrepancy
may arise from the different self-report measures: Metcalfe used
Feeling of Warmth (FOW) ratings, which were generated before
the problem was solved and investigated pattern ratings; Salvi
et al. (2016) used participant indications of within-experiment
defined insight that were given after the problem was solved (i.e.,
participants agreed that the solution was sudden, surprising, and
felt like a small Aha moment).
We asked participants to rate the strength of insight related
affect, and were so able to investigate the relationships between
accuracy and insight components on a continuous measure (as
used in Danek et al., 2014a), compared to the more common
dichotomous measures of insight3. Our results are congruent
with Salvi et al. (2016): a feeling of Aha is associated with
accuracy. Our data could be interpreted in a similar manner to
Salvi et al. (2016); that is, that an Aha experience is elicited during
an insightful problem solving process. However, our use of a
rating scale rather than a binary response enables us to investigate
the strength of an Aha experience, which varies with a moderate
relationship with accuracy.
At this point we must raise the possibility of a distinction
between a sudden insight as a process as opposed to an affect.
Whether post-hoc self-reports of Aha reflect insightful processing
is unclear. Our data indicate that the feeling of insight varies in
strength and that the strength of an Aha is related to Surprise
3While in the examination of the frequency of responses on the response scale, we
do see modes at the extreme values of 0 and 100; however, there is also substantial
data that ranges between these values. For instance, 35% of the responses were
in the inner quartile range and 70% of responses did not equal the extreme
values. We therefore determined that dichotomising the continuous data would
discard relevant information. Furthermore, the proportion of inner quartile range
responses make it unclear where the cut-off should be between “no insight” and
“insight.” Consequently, we determined that splitting the scale at 50 would be
problematic since this would be grouping quite substantial feelings of aha into the
no insight category.
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more than accuracy. Our results indicate that there are many
components to problem solving that is accompanied by an Aha.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
The use of classic insight problems as pure, hybrid, or non-
insight problems arise primarily from the papers of Weisberg
(1995) and Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987); however, there has
been little investigation regarding the efficacy of these problem
types to elicit insight. We found significant differences in the
efficiency of problem types in eliciting Aha experiences in a
direction that was as expected: pure insight problems elicited
the greatest degree of Aha, then hybrid problems (CRAs),
and finally non-insight problems elicited the lowest ratings of
Aha. This may be a reflection of how well-defined a problem
is (DeYoung et al., 2008). An ill-defined problem (i.e., an
insight problem) may be more likely to result in a feeling of
surprise in the solution, which is in turn related to an Aha
experience.
A shift to using insight problems as ill-defined problems
may help avoid a number of the issues in the literature.
DeYoung et al. (2008) does not require subjective feedback
regarding the feeling of insight as they use insight problems
as stimuli that require restructuring, thereby acknowledging
and utilizing the potential problems of these stimuli. Our
experiments therefore compare well-defined to ill-defined
problems. Well-defined problems contain sufficient information
in the question to allow steady progress toward a solution
(DeYoung et al., 2008), while ill-defined problems have
insufficient information to allow for incremental progress and
typically require restructuring in how the problem is approached
(as in an insight problem). Thus, insight problems are used
by DeYoung and colleagues as a subordinate set of ill-defined
problems.
Nevertheless, the comparison of problems which have been
defined as non-insight or insight problems or even well/ill-
defined problems retain the problem of trying to verbally define
the processes of interest, rather than relying on computational
approaches to identify latent cognitive processes that underlie
task performance (e.g., Hélie and Sun, 2010).
INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING
The majority of research conducted into the efficacy of insight-
eliciting problems has been conducted on CRAs (see, e.g., Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Sandkühler and
Bhattacharya, 2011; Wegbreit et al., 2012; Salvi et al., 2016).
Our data is congruent the finding that CRAs are able to elicit
feelings of insight but do not do so necessarily. Furthermore,
our results indicate accuracy is a significant factor of the
Aha response.
The current data support the use of successfully solved insight
problems as measures of elicited insight, yet they also call for
caution; the positive relationship between Aha and accuracy in
insight problems is moderate, and by no means very strong. Our
data also provides indications of insight problems solved without
feelings of insight.
Despite their use as a control for insight problems in research
(Murray and Byrne, 2001; Ash and Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 2008;
Gilhooly et al., 2010; Wieth and Zacks, 2011; Wen et al., 2013;
DeCaro et al., 2015), “non-insight” problems demonstrated a
significant positive correlation when completed by students
with high English proficiency. These results are comparable
to those of Davidson (1995), who reported that 12–13% of
non-insight problems indicated an insight pattern of FOW
ratings. They are also comparable to Metcalfe (1986), who
reported insight problems and anagrams showing both an
insight and incremental pattern of analysis (Feeling of Knowing
ratings), again indicating that problems can be solved both
with feelings of insight, and by working through each step
(Bowden, 1997; Weisberg, 2014).
The positive relationship between accuracy and Aha in insight
and non-insight problems alike is congruent with the literature
that indicates that problems can be solved with and without
feelings of insight (Danek et al., 2016), and calls for the use of
some form of self-report in all studies investigating insight affect
and insight processes.
CONCLUSION
The current study indicates that accuracy is often heralded by
feelings of insight and insight-related affect (such as Confidence,
and Pleasure). We have indicated that Surprise may be a
significant indicator of Aha experiences, as it has a moderate to
strong positive relationship to Aha experiences while only a weak
relationship to solution accuracy.
Further, we have shown that both well-defined and ill-
defined problems (or non-insight, and insight problems
respectively) can be solved both with feelings of insight, and
by consciously working through each step (Weisberg, 2014).
Without participant driven feedback regarding feeling or
occurrence of insight, the assumption that some problem types
elicit insight, and are solved using particular processes (i.e.,
insightful or analytic) is highly problematic. While this data
cannot tease apart whether feelings of insight in problem solving
is indicative of a “special” and separate process, it does provide
evidence for insight and insight-related quale in insight and
non-insight problems.
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